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Abstract
Health Information Exchange (HIE) is an infrastructure that facilitates exchange of elec-
tronic health records between healthcare organizations. Because medical records are highly
sensitive data subject to various federal and local regulation, in addition to company policies,
it is imperative to provide privacy and security guarantees, as well as audit trail.
In this thesis, we consider the problem of providing the functionality of a HIE composed
of a distributed collection of providers (sources) who contribute to a centralized repository
represented by a cryptographic file system, and suggest an implementation that demonstrates
its feasibility. While security-enhanced file systems have been extensively studied before,
more recent research establishes a rigorous standard of formally provable security properties.
However, since encryption imposes overhead and loss of functionality, we propose a novel
cryptographic construction called BlindStorage that enables keyword search capability over
encrypted indices.
The major contribution of this work is the demonstration how an advanced encryption
technique can be deployed in a context close to the requirements for a standards-based HIE.
We emphasize practical aspect of our design by using Web Services-based transactions that
closely follow a subset of the state-of-the-art Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing-b (XDS.b)
standard in the architecture. Document Repository and Document Registry gateways are
being used to interface between hospital-facing Web Services and the central BlindStorage
parts of the network, so that hospital applications can use the established XDS.b exchange
standard without being affected by the core BlindStorage-based implementation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last two decades the government, industry, and academia have been incraesingly
recognizing the importance of health information technology. Healthcare has tended to
lag other industries (like communications and financial services) in transiting to electronic
records. However, as proprietary electronic medical record (EMR) systems get deployed
at healthcare organization, so does the need increase to exchange records via a Health
Information Exchange.
At the same time, multiple federal, state, and organizational policies prohibit insecure
transfer of certain type of sensitive medical data. It follows that unless we are willing
to accept negative consequences of incomplete information (that could potentially lead to
misdiagnoses or adverse effects of interacting prescription medication), we must use strong
cryptography that could be mathematically proven to be equivalent to physical security.
There exists a variety of HIE architectures, both in production and as prototypes, that
prevent unauthorized access to documents in transit. However, they are mostly focused
access control mechanism, and in cases where encryption at rest is used, no formal security
analysis is possible due to their complexity.
All architectures of complex systems could be classified as either distributed or centralized,
and HIEs are no exception. From the security point of view, distributed approaches are often
optimal, as nodes that wish to communicate with each other can establish a secure point-to-
point link, and exchange information directly without leaking anything to the environment.
Unfortunately, point-to-point design often leads to quadratic complexity and inefficiency,
and limited functionality. For instance, it is very difficult to implement a successful search
feature without a central index. Similarly, each transaction in the system should be subject to
audit, which is significantly easier to accomplish with a centralized component that can take
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part in all transactions. Therefore, we argue that a centralized architecture that guarantees
security no weaker than in a distributed approach is optimal.
Virtually the only way to accomplish this goal is to use cryptography, which immediately
introduces another challenge — severe loss of functionality. As a rule, the stronger the
cryptogtaphic scheme is, the less observers can find out about the data, and therefore, the
fewer operations could be performed on it. This relegates the hub in centralized architectures
to a mere “dumb” storage device, losing ability to leverage potential functionality that we
discussed before. This is the reason why the research community makes major efforts to
enrich cryptographic schemes with additional functionality.
One of the most popular, and wildly applicable, examples of such functionality is search-
able encryption. It generally refers to schemes that allow pre-precessing of the record to
contruct an index, which will later be used for keyword look-ups. Moving beyond single
keywords — e.g., to wildcard searches or even keyword conjunctions — is still a research
question.
In this thesis, we introduce a searchable encryption scheme called BlindStorage that can
be used as a foundation of a centralized HIE architecture that maintains strong security
guarantees. It was designed with security proofs in mind from the early stages, and therefore
provides an advantage over other HIE architectures. In addition, one of its strong points is
that in only requires a Get/Put interface to a storage devices, which allows to use readily
available highly scalable NoSQL products, instead of creating a storage server from scratch.
However, we must still demonstrate that our HIE will be practical and interoperable
enough to provide additional motivation for its implementation. In order to show this, we
wrap BlindStorage around a web services-based environment that closely follows the princi-
ples of Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS.b) profile, which is used as the standard
of choice for established health information exchange. We design gateway nodes that relay
messages between web services and BlindStorage parts of the architecture. We implemented
each part in a programming language that best fits its requirements (C++ for BlindStor-
age — bit manipulation, efficiency, pointer arithmetic; Java EE for web services - readily
available frameworks, simplicity of higher-level language abstractions). The system was also
tested by exchanging a CCD document that was published for CDA guideline validation.
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This rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we give background and dis-
cuss related work on approaches to secure storage, searchable encryption, and applications
of encryption in the healthcare domain. We also discuss health information exchanges —
a number of proposed architectures, and messaging standards in use. Chapter 3 presents
the HIE architecture, and how it can be implemented with BlindStorage building blocks
— low-level file system and searchable encryption that is built on top of that, as well the
connectivity layer that relays messages between web services and BlindStorage components.
Implementation is discussed in Chapter 4, and we talk about limitations, alternative ap-
proaches, and possible extensions in the final two chapters.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Secure Cryptographic Storage
Over the past decade, we have observed several major trends in computing that direct the
industry and research efforts. First, more and more computing devices are connected online
each day, along with the humans that use them. Major new industries such as advertising
and social media accommodate new customers, but require gathering vast quantities of data
for analytics. Additionally, already established industries seek to better understand and
optimize their processes with data mining (business intelligence). This gives rise to the
phenomenon of “big data”, directing a lot of effort towards efficient management of data
sets. Second, this data grows at a faster rate than the capacity of individual processors as
predicted by Moore’s law, making it necessary to distribute storage and computation across
multiple machines. Finally, financial advantages such as specializing and aligning business
structure around specific types of services that benefit from economy of scale enabled growth
of companies that specialize in managing other parties’ data. These trends set a fertile ground
for rising popularity for cloud computing, hosted systems, and storage outsourcing.
While some industries work with data that is not considered particularly sensitive and
therefore can immediately take advantage of cloud storage providers, healthcare is abided
by multiple regulations to ensure confidentiality and integrity of patients’ data. Any solution
that uses third-party services providers must provide strong security and privacy guarantees
on top of their primary function (e.g., file storage). There is a variety of federal and local
laws that prohibit transfer of certain classes patients’ data in health information exchanges,
such as genetic information, substance abuse, mental health, and HIV/AIDS. However, if
security of an HIE-like system could be mathematically proven to not leak any information
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Figure 2.1: Convergence between efficient file systems and secure key-value stores
at all, it might be possible to not be subject to these laws.
As a result of increasing recognition of the importance of security, research community
has been exploring various approaches towards securing storage systems with cryptography.
The overall process is illustrated in Fig 2.1. One approach is to retrofit existing file systems
that were primarily designed for efficiency and functionality with partial security features
such as encryption of file contents and paths, while another approach is to move forward
from theoretically secure but inefficient key-value stores, enriching them with functionality
and improving efficiency.
2.1.1 File systems
Traditionally, a file system has been considered local to a computer; therefore, most research
was directed towards making file systems consistent, error-resistant, and efficient, and little
towards security. Early distributed file systems such as NFS did not focus much on security
either, and when they did, they did not consider protecting data from the server, as the most
common setting was that both the server and the clients were under the same authority.
Hence, only access control mechanisms such as authentication and authorization were being
improved to prevent unauthorized users, while still assuming that systems administrators
were working under common authority. As a result of this common setting, little effort was
made to secure contents of the files from the file server.
One of the first file system designs that explicitly focused on security through cryptogra-
phy, the Cryptographic File System (CFS) was introduced by Matt Blaze in 1993 [1]. Users
can associate a key with the directories they wish to protect, and file contents and paths in
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corresponding directories will be encrypted and decrypted by a system-level daemon. Clear-
text is never stored or sent to remote file server, and CFS can use any available file system
including remove file servers such as NFS.
Next incremental improvement of CFS is the Transparent Cryptographic File System
(TCFS) [2]. It provides more convenience and flexibility compared to CFS, by allowing
more granular file-level encryption (e.g., an option to skip executables and only encrypt
document), and one-time authorization that will persist across file accesses by the same
user.
Cryptfs [3] is another prominent early cryptographic file systems that is similar to CFS
and TCFS. It is implemented as a kernel module with a stackable vnode interface, meaning
that it serves as a wrapper around traditional vnodes. It provides a number of incremental
advantages, such as not requiring auxiliary storage space on a local disk (that could lead to
potential vulnerabilities), and working with later versions of NFS.
One common major disadvantage of all these approaches is the total lack of theoretical
security analysis, potentially making them vulnerable for future attacks. In addition, they
do not provide any extra functionality or flexibility beyond file access, with further restric-
tions by their kernel module implementations. While we may be convinced that the basic
functionality of encrypting file contents is reasonably error-free, it is much more difficult for
the authors to convince us that metadata-relation operations remain secure.
2.1.2 Key-value stores
Key-value stores have been gaining popularity in clouds and other distributed systems. Mul-
tiple large-scale cloud storage providers emerged, such as Amazon S3, Microsoft Azure, and
Dropbox, providing a key-value interface to their systems. Traditional relational databases
have given way to NoSQL stores that exhibit higher scalability and response time in ex-
change for lesser consistency. In addition, while securing relational databases is possible as
demonstrated by projects such as CryptDB [4], the inherent need for server-side computa-
tion due to relational algebra severely limits cryptographic approaches. On the other hand,
it is trivial to encrypt values in key-value stores, and decrypt them on the client side, while
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still taking advantage of the distributed nature of cloud infrastructure. Because of this,
significant research efforts are directed towards enhancing cryptographic cloud storage sys-
tems with extra functionality, such as adding search capability [5], proof of data possession
protocols [6], and public auditing [7]. Seny Kamara and Kristin Lauter give an excellent
overview of cryptographic cloud storage architectures in [8].
In the next three sections, we concentrate on the problem of searchable encryption. There
are two general approaches to enabling search - either using a homomorphic encryption
scheme that remain inefficient, or by designing a data structure that contains a precomputed
index with an elaborate construction. Within the data structure approach, schemes are
differentiated into oblivious RAMs, private-key cryptosystems, and public-key approaches.
Oblivious RAMs
Oblivious RAM (O-RAM) is a data structure that solves the problem of searchable en-
cryption in full generality, first proposed by Goldreich [9] and Ostrovsky [10]. It was first
investigated in context of untrusted random access memory that is used by programs be-
ing executed on a local computer. Oblivious RAMs hide access pattern, randomizing the
location of an object after each access, preventing the adversary from correlating trapdoors
with returned results. However, this data structure is very inefficient, requiring logarithmic
complexity of the number of rounds, as well as bandwidth per request.
O-RAM construction was improved by Pinkas and Reinman [11], who applied recent
advances in data structures such as Cuckoo hashing to enable linear external memory, and
O(log2n) request complexity. Since request complexity is still non-constant, we consider this
construction inefficient for practical considerations. In addition, their scheme only guarantees
amortized logarithmic complexity, meaning that client may potentially wait O(n) time in
the worst case. This is unacceptable with commercial cloud storage providers who typically
provide quality of service guarantees via service level agreements.
One of the latest works in O-RAMs was introduced by Stefanov et. al [12]. They decided
to not pursue traditional design decisions of O-RAMs, and instead evaluate the system in a
practical setting, and determine if practical results justify suboptimal theoretical properties.
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Their scheme requires linear client storage, but the evaluation demonstrates that for a 1 TB
file system, 858 MB of storage is needed on the client. Additionally, they reduced the con-
stant factor of the bandwidth overhead to 26x, for 1 TB configuration. The major drawback
of this scheme is that both the server and the client needs to perform complex operations and
store state, which makes error recovery difficult, and prevents using established commercial
cloud key-value stores such as Amazon S3 and Dropbox. Additionally, this scheme still has
logarithmic bandwidth overhead that is inherent to all oblivious RAMs.
Symmetric cryptosystems
One of the most influential works on symmetric searchable encryption was done by Curt-
mola et al. [5], which introduced improved definitions for both non-adaptive and adaptive
searchable encryption, as well as corresponding constructions. In this work, their SSE-1 con-
struction takes constant number of rounds, and requires linear storage space on the server,
proportional to the number of keywords and documents. However, the major drawback of
their scheme is that it requires non-trivial operations on the server-side, which cannot be im-
plemented with a simple GET/PUT interface that is supported by many popular key-value
stores today. This construction was used as the foundation for a more comprehensive stor-
age system CS2 [13], which supports additional features such as search authentication and
integrity. Their SSE-1 scheme was extended in later work to support dynamic updates [14]
and distributed architectures [15]. However, these newer papers offer only incremental ad-
vantages over the original construction.
Assymmetric cryptosystems
Public-key searchable encryption allows separation of document source and producer roles,
by enabling producers to use consumer’s public key to upload documents to the storage.
Representative work in this area was done by Boneh et al. [16], with a later construction
that allows private information retrieval [17]. The fundamental drawback that inherent to
all public-key searchable encryption schemes is that the set of keywords is vulnerable to
dictionary attacks, as search trapdoors can be generated by anyone who possesses document
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consumer’s public key. We consider keyword protection important enough in the healthcare
domain (e.g., if keywords are used for diagnoses then sensitive conditions will be revealed),
and therefore, do not use public-key encryption.
2.1.3 Encryption in Healthcare Context
As the importance of securing electronic health records started to be recognized in the last
decade along with advances in cryptographic systems, it was imminent for researchers to
propose applications of cryptography in healthcare. In Patient Controlled Encryption [18],
the authors argue that encryption can be used as a tool to implement an access control sys-
tem that allows patients to control how their records are disseminated. They explored a way
to encrypt a hierarchical XML-based medical record, such that different parts of it would
be accessible with different keys, effectively implementing access control. In Indivo [19] HIE
architecture, the authors propose to use encrypted stores at HCOs as document reposito-
ries, and the system uses general-purpose access control policies to enable personal control of
health records. This design, however, does not use any advanced encryption schemes, mean-
ing that medical records would have to be decrypted by the server before being transmitted
to clients.
On the public-key cryptography side, there have been several proposals to use attribute-
based encryption (ABE), either to allow patients to share their records among multiple
healthcare providers [20], or to enable healthcare organizations to securely export medical
records directly to patients’ mobile devices [21]. A major advantage of ABE in healthcare
context is that sensitive categories of documents (e.g., diagnoses) could be mapped to at-
tributes, and that individuals or organization that do not possess the attributes would be
denied decryption. There are still challenges with ABE schemes, such as managing effective
key distribution infrastructure and dealing with key and attribute revocations.
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2.2 Health Information Exchanges
2.2.1 Overview
Health Information Exchange refers to infrastructure that facilities exchange of medical
records between healthcare organizations, and possibly, patients. As the government started
federal and local programs to encourage implementation of information technology in health-
care, hospitals increased their efficiency and automated operations by using commercial
electronic medical records (EMR) systems. More often than not, EMR formats are propri-
etary and not easily exportable across organizations, making it difficult to exchange medical
records between HCOs. Hence, the need for regional and even national HIEs became ev-
ident, and academia, government, and industry invested heavily in exploring methods to
implement HIEs.
There is a variety of challenges associated with exchange of medical information. First and
foremost, medical data is considered extremely sensitive, and several laws have been enacted
to regulate access to it and its reporting. One of the first major laws is the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which introduces the Privacy Rule that is
heavily concerned with managing patient’s informed consent, and the Security Rule, which
specifies a number of safeguard policies that must be implemented by HCOs to protect
medical data. Following HIPAA, the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act was passed to encourage “meaningful use” of electronic health
record, with electronic health information exchange being one of the major components of
meaningful use criteria. A number of other laws such as the federal Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), and state-level Illinois Health Information Exchange and
Technology Act define sensitive information that is not allowed to be transmitted insecurely.
It follows that an effective HIE must either properly segment data (which is a major non-
trivial multifaceted problem), or provide a level of electronic security that is equivalent to
physical security (which can be accomplished by formally proving security properties of
cryptographic systems).
An important component of a successful HIE is reliable auditing, which puts constraints
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on architectural design choices.
2.2.2 Architectures
In 2010, the Presidents Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) released a
report [22] that recommended an architecture for nationwide health information exchange.
The report proposes an approach based on a separation of duties between managers of repos-
itories of health data and a key authority that does not manage health data but grants access
by making access control decisions and distributing keys. It emphasizes the importance of
protection of data both “on the wire” (in transit), and “at rest” (in a storage system). This
report had influence on a number of HIE architectures, and we particularly incorporate its
recommendation of encrypting data at rest with the possibility of using encryption as access
control in future extensions.
The Nationwide Health Information Exchange Network (NHIN) initiative launched two
major projects - CONNECT and DIRECT.
CONNECT1 is a large-scale architecture that is composed of a set of profiles and Java-
based web services for a secure interoperable health information exchange [23]. While it
provides extensive facilities for authentication and authorization, it remains unclear whether
the data is properly encrypted across the entire chain of transaction. Additionally, the
architecture is complex enough to rule out any attempts of formal security analysis.
The DIRECT project2 is a lightweight architecture for HIE that is based on S/MIME
protected email messages. In this design, the DNS system is augmented to contain “pointers”
to HCOs that participate in the exchange.
An example of a non-US health information exchange is the partially centralized Dutch
EPD [24] system, where the central hub that is run by the government contains a reference
index per patient, and the actual documents are located on hospitals’ systems. We favor the
principles of a partially centralized approach where we can use the third party to provide
as much functionality as possible while not compromising on security (e.g., auditing or
1http://www.connectopensource.org/
2http://wiki.directproject.org/
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replication), but in the EPD design, data breach of the hub can lead to major consequences
as there is no at-rest encryption.
2.3 Message Standards
Since one of the major goals of a Health Information Exchange is to promote interoperability
between different proprietary health information management systems, the choice of envelope
standard for messaging is important. Web services have been established as a popular
technology for interoperable remote method invocation, so the natural choice is to use an
XML [25] based standard.
2.3.1 Electronic Health Records
Electronic health records contain both structured data (such as patient’s information and
diagnosis/billing codes), and unstructured information (doctor’s notes), and as a result of
this, most widely-used standards for EHRs use an XML-based format. The underlying
standard behind many clinical systems is Health Level Seven (HL7), which is designed to
support all healthcare workflows. A subsection of HL7 that is used for information exchange
is collectively called Clinical Document Architecture (CDA), which is further subdivided into
Continuity of Care Records (CCR) that are used for patient summaries, and Continuity of
Care Documents (CCDs), which are used for more detailed information. The major benefit
of using CCDs is that this format is encouraged by the HITECH Meaningful Use criteria,
and therefore, the architecture proposed in this thesis must support it.
2.3.2 Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing
Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing.b (XDS.b) integration profile was developed by the IHE
and specifies a set of actors (web services) that participate in the HIE process, as well as
required and optional SOAP-based message formats that are used between these services.
Even though new revisions of XDS are still under active development, with the latest revision
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9.0 being released on August 31, 2012, it proved to be successful enough to be selected for
a number of HIE implemenetations. For example, Illinois’ Office of Health Information
Technology requires their ILHIE prototypes to support XDS.b [26].
Since we aim to support exchange of encrypted data between enterprises, we consider how
to incorporate it within the XDS.b standard. One approach is to use XML Encryption [27],
which introduces EncryptedData and EncryptedKey elements. However, recent work [28]
has shown significant vulnerabilities in XML Encryption, and we decided to not use it.
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Chapter 3
Design
3.1 Architecture
The general architecture of our health information exchange design is composed of two parts:
web services-based end notes (Document Sources and Consumers) that represent healthcare
organizations and use transactions that are heavily influenced by Cross-Enterprise Docu-
ment Sharing (XDS.b), and the core storage system that is based on searchable encryption
implemented on top of our novel cryptographic BlindStorage construction. The overall ar-
chitecture is illustrated in Fig. 3.1 with web services components color-coded in blue.
The XDS.b profile specifies five actors: Document Source, Document Consumer as end
nodes, Document Registry that maintains metadata for all documents, Document Repository
that physically stores the records, and Patient Identity Source that aggregates unique iden-
tifiers for patients and provides validation services1. We decided that implementing Patient
Identity Source was outside the scope of this thesis, and that Document Registry function
is implemented by the BlindStorage server. Its index and data structures contain the map-
ping between the keywords and references to the documents. The documents themselves are
stored in a separate storage, which is also accessible via a Get/Put interface.
In the existing design, keywords belong to a flat domain (i.e., they represent one queriable
attribute such as patient’s name), although a more complex keyword domain could be built
by using prefixes. Therefore, only a limited subset of query operations is currently supported
- specifically, requesting documents by patient’s name.
The interface between web components and BlindStorage is implemented with gateways
that translate XML-based messages into corresponding BlindStorage API calls. These gate-
1http://wiki.ihe.net/images/d/d7/XDS-Actor-Transaction-b.jpg
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Figure 3.1: Architecture overview: Web services-compliant end nodes exchange documents via gateways that relay messages
to the BlindStorage server. Messages between the services are labeled with XDS.b transactions that they correspond to.
ways are considered trusted code and define the boundaries in our security analysis, and
must reside on the healthcare organizations’ systems, either as separate visible nodes or as
intercepting proxies. The advantage of intercepting proxy configuration is that end nodes
are completely oblivious to the translation process, resulting in simplified configuration. On
the other hand, it complicates network design and introduces more points of failure while
making changes to the HIE; therefore, we decided to use the explicit approach. In this
architecture, end notes would directly establish connections to the gateways.
An alternative design was considered when the gateways would be located at the third
party that is responsible for record storage. This provides the benefit of reducing multiple
instances, as only one set of adapters would need to be active per the entire HIE system, as
opposed to having one adapter per HCO. This design could be viable without redoing the
security analysis if we assume that the organization that hosts these servers does not collude
with the core HIE provider. However, due to the increasing organizational complexity this
design was not selected for our architecture.
The main cryptographic storage architecture could be represented as a stack of layers:
BlindStorage that implements the key-value store, searchable encryption that uses BlindStor-
age to provide document indexing and keyword search capability, and the application-specific
HIE layer that translates domain-specific requests into keyword searches. The following sec-
tions in this chapter will fully describe each of these building blocks, from the lowest to the
highest layer.
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3.2 BlindStorage: Cryptographic File System2
3.2.1 Definition
The Syntax. A blind storage system consists of a client and a “dumb” storage server.
The server is expected to provide only two operations, download and upload. The data is
represented as an array of blocks; the download operation is allowed to specify a list of indices
of blocks to be downloaded; similarly, the upload operation is allowed to specify a list of data
blocks and indices for those blocks.
A blind storage system is defined by three polynomial-time algorithms on the client-
side: bstore.Keygen, bstore.Build and bstore.Access. Of these, bstore.Access is an
interactive protocol.
• bstore.Keygen takes security parameter as an input and outputs a key Kbstore (typ-
ically a collection of keys for the various cryptographic primitives used). Note that
Kbstore, which the client is required to retain throughout the lifetime of the system, is
required to be independent of the data to be stored.
• bstore.Build takes as inputs a key Kbstore, a list of ids and data (encoded as blocks)
{idi, datai}ti=1 for all the files the storage will be initialized with, and generates an array
of blocks A to be uploaded to the server.
• bstore.Access takes as input file id id, an operation specifier op (bstore.read,
bstore.write, bstore.update or bstore.delete), and optionally data data (if op is
bstore.write or bstore.update). Then it interacts with the server (through the
upload/download interface) and returns a status message and optionally file data (for
the bstore.read and bstore.update operations). For the bstore.update operation,
bstore.Access allows more flexibility:3 first it requires only id as input, and outputs
the current size of the file with that ID; then it accepts as input (an upper bound on)
2Joint work with Manoj M. Prabhakaran and Muhammad Naveed
3Our construction achieves this level of flexibility without efficiency overheads; one can always use a
bstore.read followed by a bstore.write to get the effect of an update, but this is less efficient and potentially
reveals more information.
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what the size of the file will be after update; then it outputs the current file data, and
only then requires the new data with which the file will be updated.
Security Requirement. The security requirement of a blind-storage system is specified
following the “real/ideal” paradigm that is standard in cryptographic literature. This in-
cludes specifying an adversary model and an “ideal functionality,” as detailed below. The
formal security requirement we shall require is that of Universally Composable security [29]
(but restricted to our adversary model).4
In the adversary model we consider, the adversary is allowed to corrupt only the server
passively — i.e., as an honest-but-curious adversary. (If the client is corrupt, we need not
provide any security guarantees.)
The ideal functionality is specified as a virtual trusted third party Fstore that mediates
between the client and the server (modeling the information leaked to the server). Fstore
accepts two commands from the client: Fstore.Build and Fstore.Access, along with inputs
to these commands (which are identical to the inputs to bstore.Build and bstore.Access
as described above). In this ideal model, it is Fstore which maintains the collection of files,
and performs all the operations specified by the Fstore.Build and Fstore.Access commands.
In addition, it reveals limited information to the server as follows:
• On receiving the command Fstore.Build, Fstore sends to the server the system param-
eters — namely, upperbounds on the total number of files and total amount of data
to be stored.
• On command Fstore.Access, Fstore sends a tuple (op, j, size) to the server, where op
specifies what the access operation is,j is the last instance when the same file was
accessed (j = 0 means that this file was not accessed before), and size is the size (in
number of blocks) of that file. For the bstore.update operation, the size of the file
revealed is the larger of the sizes before and after the update.
4We remark that for our setting of passive adversaries, UC security is a conceptually simpler notion than
for the setting of active adversaries. Nevertheless, for the sake of concreteness, we use the UC security model,
which automatically ensures security even when the inputs to the client are adaptively chosen, influenced
by the adversary.
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Client
⋮
⋮
(1)
input
filename
(2)
Enc(hash(filename))
(3)
random(seed), repeat 
for multiple blocks
(4)
return to client
T: index table
record ≘ file
D: data array
record ≘ file block
Figure 3.2: Simplified diagram of BlindStorage that shows two main data structures: index table T and data array D.
We remark that even when using the ideal Fstore functionality, an adversary can learn
some statistics about the files and accesses by analyzing the patterns in the information
revealed to it. Such information could indeed be sensitive, and it is up to the higher-
level application that uses a blind-storage system to ensure that this is not the case. The
cryptographic construction seeks to only match the guarantees given by Fstore.
3.2.2 Construction
Before we consider formal specification of the construction, consider the simplified diagram
in Figure 3.2. In this example, we consider the scenario when the client receives a filename
as its input (1) and retrieves the contents of the file from the servers, and there are two
files stored in the file system, represented by different patterns. Upon receiving the file
name, the client applies hash function to it to generate file id, and then encrypts file id with
format-preserving encryption to generate the index in the table T that contains the record
with addressing information (2). Each record in T corresponds to a potential file in the file
system, so that the size of T is the upper bound on the total number of files we allow to store.
After retrieving T-record, the client generates a pseudorandom set of indices of encrypted
blocks that reside in the data array D by running a pseudorandom number generator a
number of times that depends on the file size (3). Therefore, the number of records in D
multiplied by the block size determines the maximum capacity of the file system. This set
of encrypted blocks is returned to the client (4) and contains both required file blocks and
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possibly blocks that either belong to some other file, or are empty.
Next steps are not shown in the diagram. The client decrypts the set, determines which
blocks belong to the file that was requested, and returns them to the upper layer. After
that in a bstore.read operation, these blocks are re-encrypted, their version number is
incremented, and they are uploaded back to the array D. In case of bstore.update, set size
may be increased and new blocks are merged into the set, after which the set is pushed to
the server, and the corresponding index entry in T is updated with new file size.
The construction uses a variety of symbols for parameters, functions, data structures,
keys, and other elements, and we list them all along with their use in the reference table 3.1
for easy look-up.
A BlindStorage construction scheme.
The construction relies on the following primitives:
– a pseudorandom function (PRF), Φ,
– and a pseudorandom permutation (PRP), Ψ with short input/output strings; such a
PRP is a special case of a format-preserving encryption.
– a pseudorandom generator (PRG), Γ.
(In the implementation of our prototype, as described in Chapter 4, Φ and Ψ will be imple-
mented relying on the AES block-cipher.) The construction is given in terms of various size
parameters nD, mD, nT and mT, and an expansion parameter α > 1, and a super-logarithmic
function β(·), that are all specified later. k stands for the security parameter, and it is an
implicit input to all the cryptographic primitives.
• bstore.Keygen: A key KΦ for the PRF Φ, and a key KID for the PRP Ψ are generated;
Kbstore is set to be the pair (KΦ, KID).
• bstore.Build(F,Kbstore): F is a list of files f = (idf , dataf). Below sizef denotes the
number of blocks in an encoding of dataf ; each block has two short header fields
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Table 3.1: Reference table of symbols in BlindStorage construction.
A combined array of T and D for uniform indexing and simplified key-value back-
end, optional to implement
B array of versions of all blocks in D; can be merged with D in the implementation
D array that contains all encrypted file blocks, see Figure 4.2 for format
f file under consideration, consists of a file name and its data
F set of all files for initial construction
idf numeric file identifier; limited by |T|
k security parameter; needed to ensure negligible probability of failure in the anal-
ysis
KID key of the PRP Ψ (indexing of T)
KΦ key of the PRF Φ (encryption of records in T adn D)
Kbstore a pair of (KΦ, KID)
op access operation to perform on BStore, one of read, write, update, delete
Sf set of blocks in D that contains blocks of f, as well as other “overhead” blocks
Ŝf only those blocks in Sf that constitute file f, without “overhead” blocks
sizef size of file f— number of blocks
T index table that contains addressing information for data blocks, see 4.1 for
format
α expansion parameter that specifies the number of overhead blocks in Sf
β(k) defines the lower bound on |Sf | for security to hold
Γ pseudorandom generator used to generate a sequence of pseudorandom block
addresses in D from a single number; seeded with σ
Φ pseudorandom function for encrypting records in tables T and D
Ψ pseudorandom permutation for hiding the index in T
σf seed of Γ corresponding to file f
τf index in T that specifies the record corresponding to file f
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containing idf , and a version number initialized to 0. (idf is not allowed to be all 0s,
which is reserved to indicate a free block.)
– Let D be an array of nD blocks of mD bits each, and T be an array of nT (shorter)
records of mT bits each.
– Initialize every block in D and every record in T with all 0s (to be encrypted
later).
– For each file f in F,
1. Generate a pseudorandom subset Sf ⊆ [nD], of size |Sf | = max(dα · sizefe, β(k))
as follows.
(a) Generate a fresh seed σf for the PRG Γ, uniformly at random. σf is not
allowed to be all 0s, which is reserved to indicate an empty entry.
(b) Run the PRG for sufficiently many iterations, and parse the resulting
string Γ(σf) into a sequence of |Sf | integers in the range [nD]. (Duplicate
numbers in the sequence can be removed now, by inserting the numbers
into a binary search tree as they are generated, or more conveniently,
when the subset Ŝf is generated below.)
(c) These numbers form the subset Sf .
2. At location τf = ΨKID(idf) in T, record (σf , sizef). Note that this can be used
to reconstruct Sf given idf (using accees to T).
3. Check if at least sizef blocks in D that are indexed by the numbers in Sf are
free (this can be done by checking the headers of those blocks, but in this
phase, a sorted “free-list” could be used to do this faster). If not, abort. By
the choice of our parameters, this will happen only with negligible probability.
4. Pick a random subset Ŝf ⊆ Sf of size |Ŝf | = sizef , such that the blocks in D
that are indexed by the numbers in Ŝf are all free. (Instead of picking a truly
random subset, we may rely on the fact that the numbers in the sequence
used to generate Sf are in a pseudorandom order, and we can pick a prefix of
this sequence with sizef distinct numbers indexing free blocks.)
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5. Write the sizef blocks of dataf onto the blocks in D that are indexed by the
numbers in Ŝf (in increasing order). These blocks get marked as not free.
– Encode T (which has shorter records) into blocks of the same size as D (each
block with a version number field, but no id field) and combine it with D into
a single array A. This is done in such a way that given an index τ into T, it is
possible to identify a single block of A that contains the record T[τ ].
– Encrypt each block of A using the PRF Φ and the key KΦ. The version number
field is left unencrypted, while the rest is encrypted using the version number
(initialized to 0) and the index number of the block as IV. More precisely, for
the ith block A[i], we split it as vi||B[i] (vi being the version number), and then
update B[i] to B[i]⊕ ΦKΦ(vi||i).
(If the block-size of the PRF is less than the size of the block B[i], then a few
lower-order bits of the IV are reserved for use as a counter, to obtain multiple
blocks from the PRF for a single block in A.)
• bstore.Access(id, op,Kbstore): We describe the case when op = bstore.update, and
mention how the other operations differ from it.
1. First, compute τ = ΨKID(id), and recover (the block containing) the record T[τ ]
from the server.
2. Decrypt the block (by unmasking it with ΦKΦ(vi||i) where i is the index of the
block containing the record T[τ ], and vi is the version number encoded in the
block), to obtain (σf , sizef).
3. If σf is not all 0s, then output sizef as the current size of the file. Else, output a
message indicating that the file is not present; also, for the next step, set σf to be
a freshly generated seed, and set sizef to be 0.
4. Accept as input size′f , the size of the file after update.
5. Use σf to reconstruct a set Sf as described above, but with size
|Sf | = max(dα ·max(sizef , size′f)e, β(k)).
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Then retrieve the set of blocks D[Sf ] from the server.
6. Decrypt each of these blocks (using ΦKΦ and the version number and index of
the respective blocks) and identify Ŝf as the set of indices of blocks belonging to
this file (by checking if their headers match id). If Ŝf is not empty, combine these
blocks together (in increasing order of their indices) to recover the entire contents
of the file, and output it.
7. Accept as input new contents data′ encoded as size′f blocks.
8. Identify a subset Ŝ ′f ⊆ Sf of size size′f as follows. If size′f < sizef , then Ŝ ′f ⊆ Ŝf ,
is a random subset of Ŝf . Else, Ŝf ⊆ Ŝ ′f ⊆ Sf such that Ŝ ′f \ Ŝf is a random set
of free blocks in Sf . If no such subset exists, abort. Again, by the choice of our
parameters, this will happen only with negligible probability.
9. Then update D[Ŝ ′f ] with the blocks of data
′. If size′f < sizef mark as free the blocks
indexed by Ŝf \ Ŝ ′f .
10. Update T[τ ] with (σf , size
′
f).
11. Encrypt all the blocks corresponding to D[Ŝf ∪ Ŝ ′f ] and the block correspond-
ing to T[τ ] using the IV vi||i as described in the bstore.Build step, but after
incrementing vi for each block.
12. Upload the newly reencrypted blocks back to the server. Note that it is a subset
of the blocks that were downloaded that are uploaded back, with their version
numbers incremented by 1, and reencrypted.
• When op = bstore.read, the steps 1 through 6 from above are carried out, but setting
size′f = 0.
• When op = bstore.write, the behavior is the same as when op = bstore.update,
except that the new file data is taken as input upfront, and no data is returned.
• When op = bstore.delete, the behavior is the same as when op = bstore.write,
except that it takes size′f = 0, and also, the record in T[τ ] is updated with σf = 0
(indicating that there is no file).
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3.2.3 Security Analysis
We sketch a proof of security that our construction is a secure realization of the deal blind
storage functionality Fstore, for the adversary model in which the server is corrupted only
passively. The proof follows the standard real/ideal paradigm in cryptography (see [29], for
instance), and uses some of the standard conventions and terminology.
Roughly, the proof involves demonstrating a simulator S which interacts with a client
only via the ideal functionality Fstore (the ideal experiment), yet can simulate the view of
the server in an actual interaction with the client in an instance of our scheme (the real
experiment). The simulated view would be indistinguishable from the real view, even when
combined with the inputs to the client (from an “environment”). Further — and this is the
adaptive nature of our security guarantee — the inputs to the client at any point in either
experiment can be arbitrarily influenced by the view of the server till then.
Before describing our simulator, we describe the main reason for security. Suppose the
client makes a read access to a file for the first time. In the ideal experiment, the server
learns this file’s size and nothing about the other files. In the real experiment, the server
sees a couple of downloads — a record in T and a set of blocks Sf in D. Thanks to the
encryption, it is easy to enforce that the contents of these downloaded blocks give virtually
no information to the server. But we need to ensure that the location of these blocks also
do not reveal anything more than the size of this file. For instance, it should not be revealed
how many files were added to T and D before this file was added. Intuitively, this is ensured
by the fact the record in T and the pseudorandom subset Sf were determined by a process
that was independent of the other files in the system. The only way the other files in the
system influenced this process was in determining the subset Ŝf ⊆ Sf of blocks that actually
carried the data. However, recall that this subset is chosen randomly (or pseudorandomly)
from the set of free blocks in Sf , provided such a subset of adequate size exists. Though the
probability of Ŝf not existing depends on the number of occupied blocks (this probability
is zero initially, and grows as more and more files get added to the system), every subset
of Sf of that size is (virtually) equally likely to be Ŝf . Hence the simulator can sample
Ŝf from virtually the same distribution as in the real experiment, conditioned on an abort
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not occurring. Thus the crucial argument in proving security boils down to showing that
the probability of the client aborting in our protocol is negligible. We will give a standard
probabilistic argument to prove this assumption.
Now we describe our simulator S, which is in fact quite simple, and then discuss the main
combinatorial argument used to show that the simulation is indistinguishable from the real
execution. For the sake of clarity, we leave out some of the routine details of this proof, and
focus on aspects specific to our construction.
The simulator interacts with the functionality Fstore on the one hand, and interacts with
the server on the other, translating each message it receives from Fstore into a set of simulated
messages in the interaction between the client and the server in our scheme.
1. When it receives the initial message from Fstore with the system parameters, S can
calculate the size of A; it simulates the blocks in A by picking uniformly random bit
strings, with the version number in each block set to 0.
2. S initializes a table to map integers j to triples of the form (τj, Sj, Ŝj). Initially this
table is empty. After Fstore reports j∗ accesses to S, this table will have j∗ entries. S
also maintains the set X = ∪jŜj, initialized to the empty set.
3. Subsequently, in access number j∗, when S receives a tuple (op, j, size) from Fstore, it
proceeds as follows:
(a) S first checks if j > 0. If so it sets τj∗ = τj. Else it generates a random value for
τj∗ .
(b) If op = bstore.delete, S sets Sj∗ = Ŝj∗ = ∅ and (if j > 0) sets X = X \ Ŝj.
(c) If j = 0, and op 6= bstore.delete, S samples Sj∗ with |Sj∗| = max(dα · sizee, β(k))
uniformly, and a Ŝj∗) ⊆ Sj∗ conditioned on |Ŝj∗| = size, and Ŝj∗ ∩X = ∅; also, X
is updated to X ∪ Ŝj∗ .
If no such set Ŝj∗ exists, the simulation aborts.
(d) If j > 0 and op = bstore.read, S simply sets (Sj∗ , Ŝj∗) = (Sj, Ŝj).
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(e) If j > 0 and op = bstore.write or op = bstore.update, S checks if |Ŝj| > size or
not. If it is, then Sj∗ and Ŝj∗ are set to random subsets of Sj and Ŝj respectively,
of appropriate sizes. Further, X is set to X \(Ŝj \ Ŝj∗). Else, if |Ŝj| ≤ size, Sj∗ and
Ŝj∗ are set to random supersets of Sj and Ŝj respectivly, subject to the conditions
from item (3) above. Also, X is updated to X ∪ Ŝj∗ .
Again, if no such set Ŝj∗ exists, the simulation aborts.
(f) Finally, it creates the simulated view in which it downloads the record T[τ ],
followed by a request to download the blocks D[Sj∗ ]. In the case of operations
other than bstore.read, it will also request to upload new versions of blocks
indexed by Ŝj∗ , with the block number incremented, and with fresh random bits
in lieu of encrypted strings.
The simulation essentially maintains the indices of the two sets seen by the server, Sj
which is downloaded, and the set Ŝj which is uploaded back. It maintains consistency in
terms of the pattern (same subsets are used if the same file is accessed) and the size of the
files.
We note that there are two differences between this simulation and the real execution.
Firstly, the simulated execution uses truly random strings instead of the outputs from Φ
and Ψ. To handle this we can consider a “hybrid experiment” in which the real execution
is modified so that instead of Φ, Ψ and Γ, truly random functions are used. By the security
guarantees of the PRF, the PRP and the PRG (the last one applied after the others, so that
the PRG’s seed is completely hidden from the server), this causes only an indistinguishable
difference.
The second difference is in aborting: the simulation aborts when it cannot find enough
blocks which are not occupied by blocks of files that have been accessed (i.e., blocks listed in
X), whereas the real protocol aborts when it cannot find blocks which are actually unoccu-
pied (even considering files that have not yet been accessed). However, it can be seen that
at any point in the hybrid execution above, as well as in the simulated execution, the sets
Sf and Ŝf are identically distributed, conditioned on a valid set Ŝf existing. This is because,
Sf is identically distributed in both experiments (being chosen independent of the files in
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the system), and every subset of Ŝf of the right size is equally likely to be Ŝf . However, the
probability of a valid subset Ŝf existing is not necessarily the same in the two experiments.
To complete our proof, therefore it remains to show that the probability of the client or the
simulator aborting is negligible. Before proceeding, we remark that our goal here is to give
an asymptotic proof of security (showing that the error in security goes down as a negligible
function of the security parameter). The concrete parameters from this analysis are overly
pessimistic and an actual implementation can use less conservative parameters.
First, recall that in the simulation as well as in the modified real execution we are consid-
ering, the output of the PRG Γ on random seeds (used to define the pseudorandom subsets)
have been replaced with truly random strings. Then we upperbound the abort probability as
follows. Let d0 be an upperbound on the total number of data blocks that will be occupied.
Suppose there has been no abort so far, and a new file f of sizef blocks is to be inserted into the
system (either during the bstore.Build stage of during an bstore.update or bstore.write
operation). Some d ≤ d0 out of the nD blocks in D are filled. These blocks were filled by
picking random subsets, and then within these subsets, choosing random subsets with free
blocks. The net effect is of choosing a random subset of d blocks out of the nD blocks. Now,
when f is being inserted, we pick a random subset Sf of size |Sf | = max(dα · sizefe, β(k)).
The expected number of occupied blocks within this set is d
nD
· |Sf |. By a standard application
of Chernoff bound,5 the probability that more than 2 d
nD
|Sf | blocks are occupied is 2−Ω(|Sf |),
provided d
nD
is upperbounded by a constant less than 1. Since |Sf | ≥ β(k), this probability
is 2−Ω(β(k)), and since β(k) is super-logarithmic in k (for e.g., log2 k), this probability is
2−ω(log k) which is negligible in k. Thus except with negligible probability, of the |Sf | blocks
chosen, at least |Sf |(1− 2 dnD ) ≥ αsizef(1− 2 dnD ) are free. We shall pick α ≥ 11−2γ where γ is
an upperbound on d/nD so that the number of free blocks is at least sizef . Thus except with
negligible probability, the client will not abort, when adding this file. By a union bound,
the probability that it aborts remains negligible as long as it adds only polynomially many
5In choosing a random subset of blocks, the blocks are not chosen independent of each other. So in order
to apply Chernoff bound, we first consider the experiment in which the blocks are selected independent of
each other with the same fixed probability, so that the expected number of blocks chosen is, say 3/2d. Then,
by an application of Chernoff bound, except with 2−Ω(nD) probability, at least d blocks are occupied. Now,
in this experiment, we bound the probability that more than 2 dnD |Sf | blocks in Sf , again using Chernoff
bound. This probability is an upperbound on the corresponding probability in the original experiment.
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files.
3.3 Searchable Encryption6
3.3.1 Definitions
Our syntax for a searchable encryption scheme is simpler than in [15], since all non-trivial
operations are carried out by the client, and hence, there are no server side algorithms to be
specified.
A searchable encryption scheme (a.k.a. SSE or searchable symmetric encryption scheme)
consists of five probabilistic polynomial time procedures (run by the client), sse.keygen,
sse.indexgen, sse.search, sse.add and sse.remove. These procedures interact with a “dumb”
server which provides download and upload facilities to access blocks in an array, and also a
simple file-system to lookup documents by identifiers. Looking ahead, in our implementation,
the upload and download facilities are used to implement a blind-storage scheme which is used
to store the keyword indices, and the file lookup facility is used to store the actual (encrypted)
documents.
• sse.keygen: It takes the security parameter as input, and outputs a key Ksse. All of
the following procedures take Ksse as an input.
• sse.indexgen: It takes as input the collection of all the documents (labeled using docu-
ment IDs), a dictionary of all the keywords, and for each keyword, an index file listing
the document IDs in which that keyword is present.7 It interacts with the server to
create a representation of this data on the server side.8
• sse.search: This procedure takes as input a keyword w, interacts with the server, and
returns all the documents containing w.
6Joint work with Manoj M. Prabhakaran and Muhammad Naveed
7The index files can be generated by this algorithm if it is not provided as input.
8Typically, this would consist of a collection of (encrypted) documents, labeled by document indices
(different from document IDs), and a representation of the index, which in our constructions will be stored
using a blind-storage system.
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• sse.add: This procedure takes as input a new document (labeled by a document ID that
is currently not in the document collection), interacts with the server, and incorporates
it into the document collection.
• sse.remove: This procedure takes as input a document ID, interacts with the server,
and if a document with that ID is present in the server, removes it from the document
collection.
Security Requirement. As in the case of blind-storage, we shall specify an ideal func-
tionality, Fsse to capture the security requirements of a dynamic SSE scheme. We note that
the standard UC security in this case automatically ensures what has been called security
against adaptive chosen keyword attacks (CKA2-security) for searchable encryption.
Fsse accepts one of the following commands from the client (along with corresponding
inputs, as described above), and behaves as follows. It initializes and maintains the document
collection as specified by the commands, and answers the search queries correctly based on
the current document collection. In addition it informs the server which command was
received and reveals additional information as follows:
• On receiving the command Fsse.indexgen, it reveals to the server the multi-set consist-
ing of the sizes of all the documents, and a system parameter specifying a (typically
liberal) upperbound on the total number of keywords and (keyword, document) pairs
supported by the system. The documents in the set are assigned serial numbers for
future reference (sorted randomly). We shall refer to these documents as the original
documents (as opposed to newly added documents).
• On receiving the command Fsse.add, it reveals to the server the size of the document.
A serial number is assigned to this document (counting from the original documents
and all the newly added documents) for future reference. Note that many documents
with the same document ID can be deleted or added back, but the serial number is
unique for each version of the document. For each keyword in the document, the
set of serial numbers for all newly added documents (i.e., not the original documents)
(possibly deleted) that have that keyword is also revealed to the adversary.
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If a previous version of the document (i.e., a document with the same document ID)
existed in the collection, its serial number is also revealed to the adversary.
• On receiving the command Fsse.remove, it reveals to the server the serial number of
the document being removed from the collection. It reveals no additional information.
• On receiving the command Fsse.search, it reveals to the server the last instance the
same keyword was searched on (or that it is being searched for the first time) and
the set of serial numbers of all the documents that matched the search query. This
includes deleted versions of the documents.
We highlight a few aspects of our security definition, compared to that in [15] and prior
work. In [15], when a document is deleted, the scheme reveals the number of keywords in
the document and further, for each keyword, upto two other documents that share the same
keyword. This is the case even if that keyword is never searched on. In contrast, by our
security requirement, if an original document is deleted, only the number of keywords in it
that are searched can be revealed. Further, it is not revealed that a deleted document shared
a keyword with another document, unless such a keyword is explicitly searched for.
We remark that our functionality explicitly reveals deleted versions of the documents in
search results, but this information was revealed (implicitly) by the leakage functions in
[15] as well, as the identifiers for each keyword in a deleted document is revealed and this
information links the deleted documents to future searches on the same keyword (when the
same identifier for the keyword is revealed).
3.3.2 Searchable Encryption from Blind Storage
In this section, we describe how an efficient dynamic searchable encryption scheme can be
easily built on top of a blind-storage scheme.
The construction uses a blind-storage system, and a pseudorandom permutation Ψ′ for
mapping document IDs (with versioning) to pseudorandom document indices.9
9Long document names can be handled using a hash function, in much the same way long file names
are handled in the blind-storage system. Here the hash collisions can be stored in an encrypted document
of fixed size, indexed by the pseudorandom document index, kept outside the blind-storage system.
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• sse.keygen: It generates a key Ksse = (Kbstore,KdID) where Kbstore is generated by
bstore.Keygen and KdID is a key for the PRP Ψ
′.
• sse.indexgen:
1. Firstly, for each document d, assign a pseudorandom ID η0d = Ψ
′
KdID
(0||idd), where
idd is the document ID, to which a single bit is prepended (to indicate that this
is a document already present while creating the initial index).
2. For each keyword w, construct an index file with file-ID index0w that contains η
0
d
for each document d that contains the keyword w. No specific format is required
for the data in this file; in particular, it could contain a “thumbnail” about each
document in the list.
3. Next, initialize a blind-storage system with the collection of all these index files
(using bstore.Build).
4. Also, (outside of the blind-storage system) upload encryptions of all the docu-
ments labeled with their pseudorandom document index η0d.
• sse.remove: To minimize the amount of information leaked, we rely on a lazy delete
for documents that are already present during sse.indexgen (but not for the documents
that were added later).
Given a document ID idd, proceed as follows:
1. First check if a document with index η0d = Ψ
′
KdID
(0||idd) exists, and if so delete it
(using the file system interface of the server). The index files are not updated for
the keywords in this document right away, but only during a subsequent search
operation (see below).
2. Else (if there was no file with index η0d), check if a document with index η
1
d =
Ψ′KdID(1||idd) exists. If it does not, return a status message to indicate this. If it
does exist, proceed as follows:
(a) retrieve document indexed by η1d, and then delete it.
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(b) for each keyword w in the document, use the blind-storage bstore.update
facility to update the index file with file-ID index1w to remove η
1
d from it.
• sse.add: To add a document d to the document collection, first call sse.remove to
remove any earlier copy of a document with the same document ID. Then proceed as
follows:
1. Firstly assign it a pseudorandom document index as η1d = Ψ
′
KdID
(1||idd). Note that
the bit preprended to idd in this case is 1, to indicate that this is a document that
was added after creating the initial index.
2. Then, for each keyword w that appears in this document, use the bstore.update
facility of the blind-storage scheme to update the file with file-ID index1w to include
η1d. Note that the file-IDs used in this phase are different from the ones used during
sse.indexgen. Also, note that the bstore.update operation will create a file if it
does not already exist.
• sse.search: Given a keyword w, retrieve the two index files with file-IDs index0w and
index1w from the blind-storage system: for the file index
1
w the bstore.read operation is
used, and for the file index0w, the first stage of bstore.update operation is used. All
the documents containing the keyword w have their document indices listed in these
two files. Attempt to retrieve all these documents from the server; but some of the
documents listed in index0w could have been deleted. Complete the bstore.update
operation on the file index0w to remove the deleted files from its list.
3.4 HIE Interface
The HIE interface is performed with two web services that use messaging format correspond-
ing to a subset of XDS.b transactions: Document Registry and Document Repository. The
definition of these two web service gateways is given in Figure 3.3, and explained in next
two sections.
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Document Registry:
• RegistryStoredQuery(Keywords) : OIDs
Document Repository:
• ProvideAndRegisterDocumentSet(Keywords, Documents) :
Success/Failure
• RetrieveDocumentSet(OIDs) : Documents
Figure 3.3: Inteface definition for web service gateways.
3.4.1 Document Registry
The role of document registry gateway is to map a set of keywords to a set of document
references that contain these keywords. In the scenario that we implemented as described
in 4, this service uses patient’s first name and family name as the keywords. The XDS.b
profile uses globally unique object identifiers (OIDs) for documents, which can also be used
as keys in the secondary storage. Within the XDS.b profile, this transaction is known as
Registry Stored Query (ITI-18).
Document Registry web services invokes the HIE layer of BlindStorage with keywords as
parameters, which are then passed down the stack to the searchable encryption layer. Upon
the completion of BlindStorage access operation, object identifiers are returned to the HIE
layer, translated to SOAP response message, and passed back to the Document Consumer.
3.4.2 Document Repository
The Document Repository gateway serves both the Source and the Consumer; hence, it must
implement two separate methods. The first method corresponds to Retrieve Document Set
(ITI-43) transaction and is rather unsophisticated. Since at this stage keyword look-up
has already been performed and Document Consumer knows the set of document OIDs to
retrieve, the gateway only needs to pass these identifiers down to the BlindStorage module
as a simple Get request. This request is then relayed to the secondary storage that contains
bodies of the documents in encrypted form, and is then passed back to the Consumer.
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The second service implemented by Document Repository corresponds to XDS.b Provide
and Register Document Set (ITI-15) transactions. In this case, the gateway is responsible for
accepting a set of Continuity of Care Documents of a particular patient, extracting patient’s
name, translating them into keywords, and invoking the HIE layer of BlindStorage with a set
of (keyword, document) pairs. This request is then translated into the bstore.write opera-
tion, BlindStorage index is updated with a new mapping between the keyword and document
reference, and the CCD document is encrypted and stored in the secondary storage.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
Since our HIE architecture consists of two major components - the interoperable, web-
services based side that directly interfaces with hospital systems, and the secure, efficient
BlindStorage part, it was also prudent to consider different technology choices for their
implementation. The cryptographic storage and searchable encryption components need to
perform a significant amount of bit-level manipulation, efficient encryption and decryption,
and pointer arithmetic, and we decided to implement it in C++. On the other hand, the HIE
side had to be based on web services per our general design and goal to follow XDS.b profile
as closely as possible, and would benefit from a higher-level language and readily available
frameworks to generate boilerplate code. The Java EE platform provides a convenient JAX
API along with a set of tools to generate web service definition language (WSDL) descriptor
files directly from the source code, and therefore, we chose to implement the HIE side in
Java.
Besides these advantages, intentionally selecting different technologies for implementing
an advanced encryption technique and a standards-based HIE serves as a basis of measuring
the transparency of our solution to the HIE context for the purpose of evaluation. We will
consider the project successful when a document producer can upload a valid CCD document
to the HIE using an XDS.b-like interface, and a document consumer can retrieve it using
only registry and repository services.
4.1 BlindStorage
The core BlindStorage code is implemented as a set of C++ object, built around T and D
tables. The format of their records are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
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size seed
4 4size (bytes)
T-record
encrypted
Figure 4.1: Record format in the T table.
raw data version
1024 (parametrized) 4size (bytes)
D-record high_idlow_idpad
1 4 4
encrypted
Figure 4.2: Record format in the D table.
Each T-record that corresponds to a file contains file size (in the number of blocks), and
a 32-bit PRG seed, encrypted with Kbstore. Whenever file blocks need to be accessed from
D table, the seed is used as a parameter to the srand() function, and the rand() PRG is
called 4 ∗ size times. We set the expansion parameter α to 4 as it provides nearly optimal
balance between the probability of failure (not being able to find free blocks), and overhead.
There are two representations of T and D data structures in memory . First, during the
initial construction phase of BlindStorage TDisk and DDisk are located in local memory and
can be accessed directly. After the initial Build operation is completed, these structures
are saved to the disk (or uploaded to a remote key-value server) and are no longer accessed
directly. Instead, we follow the proxy design pattern1, and use two other objects - TFile
and DFile. These do not store data in memory, but instead access records on demand. In
a local implementation of BlindStorage, this is done by seeking to a correct position in the
file; in the distributed version, it sends a GET(index) request to the key-value store.
Each T and D record has a pair of method to encrypt and decrypt its data with AES-128
(Crypto++ library is used).
The BlindStorage code is compiled as a local executable, and accepts queries through
a command line interface. Java web services in return run these processes through an
execute() method, and communicate via standard input and standard output streams. Al-
though this way of inter-process communication is suboptimal in terms of both performance
1http://www.oodesign.com/proxy-pattern.html
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and general software engineering practices (Java Native Interface (JNI) being the alterna-
tive), it allows effortless testing of individual layers, as BlindStorage executables can be
launched and tested directly from the command line.
4.2 Web Services
Our goal of implementing web services was to remain as close to standards-based HIE as
possible while keeping the scope of this project manageable. One of the most comprehensive
open HIE frameworks with source code readily available is NHIN CONNECT, and we studied
what features is supports and what technologies it is built on, to replicate a scaled-down
version of a production system. The Enterprise Service Components in the CONNECT
solution provide implementation of XDS.b Document Registry and Repository actors which
is claimed to be one of “critical enterprise components required to support electronic health
information exchange” 2. Examining the underlying technology behind CONNECT shows
that it is built using Java Enterprise Edition (JEE), and in particular, Java API for XML
Web Services (JAX-WS).
This investigation gives evidence that we will accomplish our goal of staying close to
the requirements for a standards-based HIE system if we use the same technologies for our
implementation.
We implemented the four actors that correspond to XDS.b actors using Java EE and JAX-
WS on Apache Tomcat 7 with Apache Axis. Document Repository and Document Registry
actors are represented as web services. On the other hand, Document Source and Document
Consumer actors are connection initiators, and they are implemented as standalone Java
application that use web services client library.
The Document Source application accepts a set of CCD documents as its input, processes
them to locate XML <patient> node, and extracts patient’s first and last name from this
node. These two names are then merged into a single keyword, and transmitted to Document
Registry along with CCD contents. Document Consumer first invokes Document Registry
to look-up document object identifiers that belong to a particular patient, and then contacts
2http://www.connectopensource.org/about/what-is-connect
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Document Repository to retrieve these documents.
4.3 Evaluation
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a series of testing
tools “for promoting the adoption of standards-based interoperability by vendors and users
of healthcare information systems”, which includes validation tools and sample CCD docu-
ments. For the evaluation of our project, we downloaded a representative Healthcare Infor-
mation Technology Standards Panel (HITSP) summary document using HL7 CCD from the
MeaningfulUse Examples Jan20113 data set. Since these documents were explicitly pub-
lished for testing conformance of HIEs to CDA standards, we consider this data set to be
ideal for our purpose of evaluation of correctness and transparency.
We successfully transmitted the test document through our HIE implementation, and
verified correctness. Since neither Document Source nor Document Consumer actors were
aware of BlindStorage and only communicated with Registry and Repository services, we
also successfully verified correctness.
3http://xreg2.nist.gov/cda-validation/downloads.html
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Chapter 5
Discussion
In this chapter, we will explore a number of topics that are relevant to HIEs in general and
our implementation in particular.
5.1 Push and Pull Methods
Health information exchanges use one of two exchange methods — “push” technology, when
the document source automatically delivers clinical data without a prompt, and a “pull”
method (also known as portals) that requires physicians to search for the data they need [30].
We observe that our implementation acts as a hybrid of these two: on one hand, consumers
do not directly communicate with sources and therefore sources must proactively upload
records to the repository as in the “push” model. On the other hand, searchable encryption
provides an option for consumers to perform basic queries that is more typical of a “pull”
method.
We first discuss the advantages of both approaches. One problem with “push” methods is
that typically there must be a pre-existing patient-physician relationship to enable this kind
of delivery. With data being encrypted in the repository, document sources could push the
record to the HIE in advance, and instead only control access through key distribution. The
document consumer benefits in a similar way, as it only needs to contact the HIE storage
for the document instead of locating and connecting to the source.
Unfortunately, in additional to getting some benefits of both methods, we also receive
their limitations. Before a document is pushed out to the HIE, the document source must
know which keywords will be considered during subsequent queries, and update the index
with these keywords. To provide functionality of flexible searches the source must either
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precompute many keyword combinations or subdivide the keyword namespace into a non-
flat structure, or our architecture would need to be extended with multiple BlindStorage
systems that would represent different indices. Document consumers are similarly limited
by both the type of queries they are allowed to make (keyword searches), and flat keyword
domains.
5.2 Efficiency
Another topic of discussion is whether efficiency (or performance) is important for HIEs.
Since no summary statistics on HIE document rate were readily available, we will not spec-
ulate on specific numbers. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that virtually every
nontrivial cryptographic scheme that supports advanced functionality is bound by some
performance bottleneck — whether it is the number of keyword combinations supported,
worst case access time, or storage overhead. Any index-based searchable encryption scheme,
including ours, supports a trivial extension of functionality by building another layer on
top of keywords. For example, document repositories could natively support basic keyword
conjunctions by building the index from keyword pairs in the first place. This increases the
number of keywords quadratically.
A simple example like this demonstrates that in any case, better efficiency is preferred
as it can be traded in for other features — be it functionality, fewer number of servers, or
simpler maintenance. Therefore we consider that performance advantages of BlindStorage
as compared to other cryptographic schemes remain meaningful and useful even if we cannot
directly measure the impact of efficiency.
5.3 Key Infrastructure
A major component of any distributed system with different levels of access is the key
infrastructure. In-depth exploration of key infrastructure for a HIE is a topic of a project of
no lesser size, but we can make several remarks.
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In our design, we assume that there exists only one set of symmetric keys for all sources
and consumers that participate in the exchange. While we did reject public-key searchable
encryption on the basis of insufficient keyword protection, this does not mean that a public
key infrastructure could not be used for dissemination of symmetric keys to the index.
Additionally, searchable encryption that is built on top of BlindStorage uses different keys
for keyword protection and encryption of medical records, which implies that there could be
a variety of combinations of keying schemes.
5.4 Who Runs The HIE?
The questions of making the business case for an entity and justifying its existence can be
easily overlooked if we only look at the architecture from the technical point of view. It has
been claimed that arguably superior technologies — such as a distributed social network
Diaspora — never made an impact due to lack of either a business model or some other
support.
In case of health information exchanges, there exists enough evidence that states and even
federal government are willing to run such an infrastructure as a public service. Nevertheless,
it is worthy to consider other alternatives.
In fact, we claim that the cryptographic nature of our HIE design opens new opportuni-
ties for private businesses to provide the services of Document Registries and Repositories.
BlindStorage has already been explicitly designed to support a minimal key-value storage
back-end (which we call secondary storage), and since the index is never seen in plain-text
by the server, it is entirely plausible that a private enterprise that is unaffiliated with HCOs
can operate a limited HIE — an option that is not possible with traditional HIEs.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis we considered how a health information exchange can be implemented with a
cryptographic storage scheme that supports keyword search. We discussed common archi-
tectures of HIEs, why they are important, some of the driving factors behind the adoption
of information technology, and how cryptography can be of assistance in the healthcare
domain. While cryptography can be a power tool, it imposes severe limitations on function-
ality, which is the reason for many approaches to data preprocessing and indexing prior to
encryption.
We introduce BlindStorage, a cryptographic file system that is easily used as a building
block to implement searchable encryption. In its turn, searchable encryption provides an
interface a domain-specific application, which in our case is a gateway that connect a greater
distributed HIE to the secure core. One of the main contributions of this paper was the
demonstration how an advanced encryption technique can be deployed in a context close to
the requirements for a standards-based HIE, which was evaluated for correctness and end-to-
end transparency with a test CCD dataset. Finally, other secondary aspects were discussed
that are relevant to health information exchanges and our implementation in particular.
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